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Abstract 
Human rights problems and issues have become global, but human rights law has continued to focus 
primarily or exclusively on the domestic or territorial State. Given the multiplicity of State and non-
state actors with varying degrees of power and importance, human rights law needs to be adapted, so 
that new duty-bearers such as foreign States, transnational corporations and international organisations 
can be integrated into the human rights legal regime. Over the last decade, efforts have been made to 
elaborate principles or frameworks that define the human rights obligations of different types of other 
duty-bearers than the domestic or territorial State. In this paper, we are concerned with what can be 
learnt from these norm-setting efforts conceptually. 
Keywords 
Transnational human rights obligations – extraterritorial states – transnational corporations – 
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I. Introduction* 
Economic globalisation has so far not been paralleled by a “globalisation of human rights law”1. But it 
should. That is the starting point of this paper. While the “institutions of the global economy”2 – the 
International Financial Institutions3 such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and transnational corporations (TNCs) all have grown in 
importance and impact,4 the applicability of human rights law, and its meaning and scope, has not 
followed suit. While “problems have become transnationalized”,5 human rights law has continued to 
focus primarily or exclusively on the domestic or territorial State. This had led scholars to conclude 
with regard to the IFIs for example, that they enjoy a “privileged exceptionalism under international 
law”, for “de facto international law imposes few constraints on IFI operations”.6  
So while territorial States legally bear the primary responsibility for human rights violations, they 
are not always able (nor willing) to live up to their human rights obligations. When it comes to issues 
of poverty and the lack of realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, the territorial State sits 
not always in the driving seat: decisions of other, equally powerful actors, such as the international 
economic institutions, transnational corporations and/or other States may have a much larger and 
profound impact on the realisation of socio-economic human rights than the territorial State has. 
Likewise, States may be subject to acts of other States that act outside their own territory, in military 
or civil operations, through development cooperation or otherwise. 
These new realities pose fundamental challenges to human rights law.7 In practice, human rights 
law may not be able to properly address these news situations, and therefore runs a risk of 
                                                     
* Law and Development Research Group, University of Antwerp Law Research School; chair of the Research Networking 
Programme Beyond Territoriality: GLObalisation and Transnational Human Rights Obligations (GLOTHRO), which is 
funded by the European Science Foundation. This paper has been written following a doctoral school jointly organized 
by the EUI Global Governance Programme and GLOTHRO. 
1 The expression is borrowed from Morais, though he used it in a different sense, it seems: H.V. Morais, The Globalization 
of Human Rights Law and the Role of International Financial Institutions in Promoting Human Rights, 33 The George 
Washington International Law Review 2000, 71-96. 
2 D. Kinley, Civilising Globalisation. Human Rights and the Global Economy, Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 3.  
3 While the notion of International Financial Institutions (IFIs) is broader than the World Bank and IMF, and includes also 
the regional development banks, for ease of reference we will use IFIs here to mean World Bank and IMF. 
4 See, e.g., with regard to transnational corporations, D.D. Bradlow and C. Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined 
Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and the IMF, 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1995, 411-442, at 423 and 
Kinley and Chambers, who have stressed the “enormous economic power that TNCs wield and the often considerable 
size of their social footprint” (D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private 
Implications of Public International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497 at 493). Bradlow and Hunter have 
pointed out “the profound, and sometimes irreversible, impact that IFI operations can have in many of those Member 
States that actually use their financial services.” and the “growing discretion, power, and reach of the IFIs in carrying out 
their expanding mission” (D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter, Conclusion: The Future of International Law and International 
Financial Institutions in D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial Institutions & International Law, 
Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2010, 387-397, at 387 and 389. 
5 D.D. Bradlow and C. Grossman, Limited Mandates and Intertwined Problems: A New Challenge for the World Bank and 
the IMF, 17 Human Rights Quarterly 1995, 411-442 at 415. 
6 D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter, Conclusion: The Future of International Law and International Financial Institutions in 
D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial Institutions & International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2010, 387-397, at 388. 
7 For a more thorough elaboration of economic globalisation and the concomitant rise of new human rights duty-bearers, 
see e.g. M.E. Salomon, A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole, Human Rights, Development and New Duty-Bearers, in M.E. 
Salomon, A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole (eds.), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and New Duty-
Bearers, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, 3-24, in particular at 3-17. 
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marginalization in endeavours to bring about social justice. Conceptually, the displacement of the 
territorial State in a good number of instances necessitates a fundamental re-thinking of a basic tenet 
of human rights law, i.e. that human rights obligations are primarily if not exclusively incumbent on 
the territorial State. Given the multiplicity of State and non-state actors with varying degrees of power 
and importance, human rights law needs to be adapted, so that new duty-bearers such as foreign 
States, transnational corporations and international organisations can be integrated into the human 
rights legal regime. For with power comes responsibility and accountability. Or, as some have put it 
purely at a legal level, as these non-state actors influence the making of the law, they should also 
accept to be subjected to it.8 
Human rights law therefore needs to be re-thought, so as to make it responsive to realities on the 
ground and to enable it to act as a corrective to power regardless of the identity of the power holder.9 
However, that does not mean that the domestic State is let off the hook. As Kinley and Chambers put 
it, “from the expansion of sites of responsibility [does not come] a corresponding reduction of a state’s 
liability in respect of human rights protection and promotion.”10 Elsewhere, Kinley has argued in 
favour of the “state’s essential guardianship of human rights within the context of the global 
economy”.11 Bradlow and Hunter have echoed this proposition as follows: “defining the international 
responsibility of IFIs […] does not obviate the need for states to fulfil their own obligations under 
international law in their relations with IFIs”, both with regard to the governance as well as the 
operations of IFIs.12 
Over the last decade, efforts have been made to elaborate principles or frameworks that define the 
human rights obligations of different types of other duty-bearers than the domestic or territorial State. 
As far as non-state actors are concerned, we will limit the analysis here to their extraterritorial or 
transnational acts or effects. The 2011 Maastricht Principles on Extraterritorial Obligations in the 
Area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights focus exclusively on the human rights obligations of 
foreign states. The 2003 Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other 
Business Enterprises with regard to Human Rights and the 2011 UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights address the obligations of home States and of transnational companies as direct 
duty-bearers. Thirdly, the 2002 Tilburg Guiding Principles on the World Bank, IMF and Human 
Rights address the obligations of members States of international organizations (the international 
financial institutions in particular) and of these organizations themselves as direct duty-bearers. While 
it is true that the legal, moral or political status of each document varies, and that none of them has as 
yet binding legal effect, they may have a declaratory importance to the extent that they codify existing 
international law; moreover, there may be possibilities for becoming indirectly binding,13 and anyhow, 
they reflect the status of current thinking on these issues. Whatever their legal status is, in this paper 
we are primarily concerned with what can be learnt from these norm-setting efforts conceptually. Is 
                                                     
8 P. Muchlinski, Multinational Enterprises as Actors in International Law: Creating ‘Soft Law’ Obligations and ‘Hard 
Law’ Rights in M. Noortmann and C. Ryngaert (eds.), Non-State Actors Dynamics in International Law: From Law-
Takers to Law-Makers, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010, 9-39, 10; D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter, Conclusion: The Future of 
International Law and International Financial Institutions in D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial 
Institutions & International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, Kluwer Law International, 2010, 387-397, at 395-396. 
9 For a more general analysis of human rights obligations for non-state actors, see A. Clapham, Human Rights Obligations 
of Non-State Actors, Oxford, OUP, 2006.  
10 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 481. 
11 D. Kinley, Civilising Globalisation. Human Rights and the Global Economy, Cambridge, CUP, 2009, 222. 
12 D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter, Conclusion: The Future of International Law and International Financial Institutions in 
D.D. Bradlow and D.B. Hunter (eds.), International Financial Institutions & International Law, Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2010, 387-397, at 394. 
13 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 483-488. 
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the fragmented method of elaboration of principles for each different actor bound to fail in dealing 
with the global landscape and its various actors? Is a holistic approach to be preferred, and how 
feasible would it be?  
In the next three sections, we will analyse the four above-mentioned sets of principles applying an 
analytical grid that focuses on three questions: first, the legal nature of the principles and more 
importantly, the legal sources that they draw on; second, the scope and meaning of the obligations 
identified; and third, the division of responsibility between the domestic State and the other actors, and 
among them. We will conclude by pointing out some of the characteristics and potential weaknesses of 
each of the sets of principles in a comparative perspective, and by flagging up some possibilities for 
future research and conceptual advancement. 
II. The Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights 
A. Background 
On 28 September 2011, the Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter: Maastricht Principles) were adopted in Maastricht, at 
the end of a three day expert meeting.14 These Maastricht Principles continue a strong tradition of 
adopting landmark documents in the field of economic, social and cultural rights (hereafter: ESC 
rights). In 1986, the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were adopted.15 They spelt out the nature and scope of the 
obligations of States Parties. In 1997, the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights were adopted.16 These Guidelines sought to clarify the nature and scope of 
violations of ESC rights, as well as responses and remedies. Twenty-five years after the adoption of 
the Limburg Principles, a new set of principles was adopted, this time on the extra-territorial 
obligations of States in the area of economic, social and cultural rights, i.e. the Maastricht Principles. 
Human rights NGOs, with FIAN taking the lead, have raised the issue consistently over the last 
fifteen years or so. Together with some pioneering scholars in the field, an ETO Consortium was 
established in 2006-2007.17 Consortium meetings in Geneva, Heidelberg, Lancaster and Antwerp laid 
the groundwork for the Maastricht Principles, mainly by creating an enabling environment for the 
                                                     
14 The Maastricht Principles can be found on http://www.icj.org/dwn/database/Maastricht%20ETO%20Principles%20-
%20FINAL.pdf and have been published in 29/4 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, 578-590. 
15 The Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
were adopted in 1986 in Maastricht. The Limburg Principles have been published in E/C.12/2000/13; 2 October 2000 and 
9/2 Human Rights Quarterly 1987, 122-135. 
16 The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were agreed upon by a group of 
experts on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of the Limburg Principles in 1997. The Maastricht Guidelines can be 
found in UN Doc. E/C.12/2000/13, 20/3 Human Rights Quarterly 1998, 691-704 and in T. van Boven, C. Flinterman and 
I. Westendorp (eds.), The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Proceedings of 
the Workshop of Experts organised by the International Commission of Jurists (Geneva, Switzerland), the Urban Morgan 
Institute on Human Rights (Cincinnati, USA) and the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights of Maastricht University, 22-
26 January 1997, SIM-Special no. 20, SIM, Utrecht, 1998, 1-12. 
17 An academic network on the issue, Beyond Territoriality: GLObalisation and Transnational Human Rights Obligations 
(GLOTHRO), a Research Networking Programme funded by the European Science Foundation (2010-2014) was 
launched in 2010 (for more information, see www.glothro.org). The ETO Consortium and GLOTHRO have a partly 
overlapping membership, which has facilitated mutual reinforcement of both networks. A joint working group meeting of 
drafting group and Consortium steering committee on the one hand, and of GLOTHRO on the other hand, was held in 
November 2010, and the 2011 Consortium meeting took place back to back with the GLOTHRO stocktaking conference 
in May 2011, in Antwerp. 
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elaboration of the Principles: these meetings allowed exploring core questions, provided a testing 
ground for concepts and principles, and offered a forum for examining real life cases. A small and 
mixed drafting group of scholars and NGO representatives was established in late 2009. This group 
prepared several drafts of the Maastricht Principles before the final discussions took place in 
Maastricht from 26 to 28 September 2011. 
The Maastricht Principles are remarkable in different respects. First of all, they try to bridge the 
divide between the two traditional human rights categories, i.e. that of economic, social and cultural 
rights (ESC rights) and that of civil and political rights (CP rights). Secondly, they lead, instead of 
follow, developments in the field of civil and political rights. The Limburg Principles and Maastricht 
Guidelines were considered to be needed in order to “catch up” with conceptual sophistication in the 
area of civil and political rights. To the contrary, the 2011 Maastricht Guidelines address an issue 
which has not yet been strongly clarified, let alone satisfactorily settled, in the area of civil and 
political rights, i.e. that of extraterritorial obligations. In the field of civil and political rights, the 
question of extraterritorial human rights obligations has mainly been reduced to questions of 
jurisdiction. By and large, extraterritorial human rights obligations have only been recognized in cases 
of effective control over territory or physical power or control over persons. With regard to ESC 
rights, it has been suggested that there may be more space for the recognition of extraterritorial 
obligations.  
B. General 
The body of the Maastricht Principles is preceded by a preamble, which explains inter alia the need for 
the Principles and some basic legal sources. The body of the Principles consists of seven sections, 
dealing with general principles (Principles 1-7); the scope of extraterritorial obligations of States 
(Principles 8-18); the extraterritorial obligations to respect (Principles 19-22), protect (Principles 23-
27) and fulfil (Principles 28-35); accountability and remedies (Principles 36-41); and final provisions 
(Principles 42-44). 
The Maastricht Principles contain some compromises to get around potentially divisive issues that 
arose in the early stages. Also, some important questions have remained unaddressed – often 
deliberately, so as to keep the exercise manageable – and necessitate further reflection and elaboration. 
During the process, the need for “Maastricht IV Principles or Guidelines” was already openly 
mentioned, in particular to clarify the obligations of non-state actors.  
C. Legal Nature of the Maastricht Principles and Legal Basis of the Obligations Identified 
The Maastricht Principles are quite vague on their own legal status, and remain almost silent on the 
sources they draw on. Whereas the Limburg Principles were said to be believed by the participants to 
reflect the then present state of international law, except when otherwise indicated, the Maastricht 
Principles only make a vague claim that they are “[d]rawn from international law” (Preambular para. 
8). Nor is the legal basis for extraterritorial obligations clearly spelt out: reference is simply made to 
the “[e]conomic, social and cultural rights and the corresponding territorial and extraterritorial 
obligations [that] are contained in the sources of international human rights law, including the Charter 
of the United Nations; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; and other universal and regional instruments” (Principle 6). 
In academic literature, emphasis has mainly been put on the different wording of art. 2 (1) ICESCR 
as compared to the ICCPR, and on the explicit reference to international cooperation and assistance in 
art. 2 (1) ICESCR, art. 4 Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) and art. 32 Convention on the 
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). Evidence for recognition of extraterritorial human rights 
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obligations has equally been sought in customary international law as well as in general principles of 
international law.18  
D. Scope and Meaning of the Obligations 
One of the salient discussion points in the lead-up to the Maastricht expert meeting was the scope of 
extraterritorial obligations and the most appropriate terminology. Should there be an exclusive focus 
on extraterritorial obligations of States, or should the Principles also include human rights obligations 
of non-State actors? And if the focus was to be on extraterritorial obligations of States, should the 
Principles be confined to extraterritorial obligations sensu stricto, or also include global obligations? 
The Maastricht Principles only deal with extraterritorial obligations of States, although the 
drafters19 have felt some temptation to go beyond that scope in some of the Principles, e.g. with regard 
to corporations and other business enterprises, and with regard to international organizations. In 
Principle 16, e.g., indirect reference is made to the applicability of the Principles to international 
organisations.20 
In Principle 1, extraterritorial obligations are said to encompass both extraterritorial obligations 
sensu stricto and global obligations: 
1. obligations relating to the acts and omissions of a State, within or beyond its territory, that have 
effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside of that State’s territory; and 
2. obligations of a global character that are set out in the Charter of the United Nations and human 
rights instruments to take action, separately, and jointly through international cooperation, to 
realize human rights universally. 
However, most of the further analysis seems to be applicable first and foremost to extraterritorial 
obligations sensu stricto. As was pointed out by the University of Antwerp Law and Development 
Research Group, 
In Principle 1, two kinds of extraterritorial obligations are mentioned, i.e. (a) obligations arising 
from foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of human rights outside a State’ territory, and (b) 
obligations of a global character. However, the Principles remain completely silent on global 
obligations in the remainder of the text. This is especially problematic in Principle 6, which 
stipulates that the ‘State’s obligation to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and cultural 
rights extraterritorially is limited to the scope of its jurisdiction in accordance with the UN Charter 
and general principles of international law’ (emphasis added). Such a limitative provision is 
incompatible with the notion of global obligations set out in Principle 1b.21 
This brings us to the difficult question whether or not to include any reference to jurisdiction. 
Jurisdiction has been at the core of the discussion on extraterritorial obligations in the area of civil and 
political rights. As it has often been more a hindrance to than a help for extending States’ human rights 
obligations beyond their territory – by and large, extraterritorial human rights obligations have only 
                                                     
18 Most recently in M. Langford, F. Coomans and F. Gómez Isa, Extraterritorial Duties in International Law in M. 
Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial 
Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming; see also S.I. 
Skogly, Beyond National Borders: States’ Human Rights Obligations in International Cooperation, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2006, in particular 73-188. 
19 ‘Drafters’ refers here not only to the drafting group, but to the expert group that adopted the Maastricht Guidelines. 
20 Principle 16 reads: “Obligations of international organisations.The present Principles apply to States without excluding 
their applicability to the human rights obligations of international organisations under, inter alia, general international law 
and international agreements to which they are parties.” 
21 For an elaboration of this point, see the comments of the Law and Development Research Group on an earlier draft (on 
file with author). 
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been recognized in cases of effective control over territory or physical power or control over persons22 
– there was quite some hesitation and even strong opposition from some to include any reference to 
jurisdiction in principles on extraterritorial obligations in the area of economic, social and cultural 
rights. Others argued that jurisdiction was a concept one cannot escape from, and pleaded for imbuing 
it with new meaning. The latter position eventually made it: the notion of jurisdiction has been 
included in the Maastricht Principles, but it has been given a very broad meaning, including not only 
situations of authority or effective control, but also situations in which acts or omissions bring about 
foreseeable effects, and situations in which a State is in a position to exercise decisive influence 
(Principle 9).23 
In addition to this attribution based on their own acts or omissions, or on their position to exercise 
decisive influence, States that transfer competences to or participate in an international organisation 
“must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the relevant organisation acts consistently with the 
international human rights obligations of that State.”24 In the 1996 Maastricht Guidelines, this 
obligation was qualified as a protect obligation.25 State responsibility also extends to non-State actors 
– such as business enterprises – that “are empowered by the State to exercise elements of 
governmental authority […].”26  
As to the meaning of extraterritorial human rights obligations, a general, negative obligation to 
“avoid causing harm” has been identified: “States must desist from acts and omissions that create a 
real risk of nullifying or impairing the enjoyment of economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially.”27 State responsibility is engaged where the breach of this obligation is “a 
foreseeable result of their conduct.”28 A procedural obligation intrinsically linked with the obligation 
to avoid causing harm is to conduct prior impact assessments.29 
Further on in the Principles, the meaning of extraterritorial obligations is fleshed out along the 
well-established tripartite typology of obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. The general, 
negative obligation to avoid causing harm is reflected in the obligation to respect:30 i.e. “to refrain 
from conduct which nullifies or impairs the enjoyment and exercise of economic, social and cultural 
                                                     
22 See many of the contributions in F. Coomans and M.T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004; M. Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties, School of Human Rights Research Series vol. 32, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2009; M. 
den Heijer, Europe and Extraterritorial Asylum, Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012 and the recent case of the European Court 
of Human Rights, 7 July 2011, Al-Skeini and others v. UK, in particular paras. 130-142. 
23 Principle 9, “Scope of jurisdiction” reads: “A State has obligations to respect, protect and fulfil economic, social and 
cultural rights in any of the following: 
situations over which it exercises authority or effective control, whether or not such control is exercised in accordance 
with international law; 
situations over which State acts or omissions bring about foreseeable effects on the enjoyment of economic, social and 
cultural rights, whether within or outside its territory; 
situations in which the State, acting separately or jointly, whether through its executive, legislative or judicial branches, is 
in a position to exercise decisive influence or to take measures to realize economic, social and cultural rights 
extraterritorially, in accordance with international law.” 
24 Principle 15. 
25 Elsewhere, I have suggested to see this rather as a respect obligation, see W. Vandenhole, Third State Obligations under 
the ICESCR: A Case Study of EU Sugar Policy, 76 Nordic Journal of International Law 2007, 73-100, at 94-95. 
26 Principle 12. 
27 Principle 13. 
28 Ibid. 
29 Principle 14. 
30 Somewhat confusingly, Principle 19 that clarifies the general obligation to respect stipulates that States must take action 
to respect ESC rights, which suggests a positive obligation. 
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rights of persons outside their territories.” (under the heading of direct interference).31 In addition, 
States need to refrain from conduct that impairs the ability of another State or international 
organisation with its obligations, or that “aids, assists, directs, controls or coerces” another State or 
international organisation to breach its obligations (indirect interference).32 A specific Principle has 
also been included on sanctions and equivalent measures.  
The obligation to protect against violations by non-State actors, i.e. private individuals and 
organisations, transnational corporations and other business enterprises, has been disentangled in the 
Maastricht Principles as an obligation to regulate, to influence and to cooperate. The obligation to 
influence is a minimal obligation, which applies “even if [States] are not in a position to regulate [the 
conduct of non-State actors].”33 Quite paradoxically, it is worded as a weak legal obligation (“should” 
rather than “must” exercise). The strong legal obligation (“must”) to regulate is limited to 
circumscribed positions to regulate, defined by leads such as territory; nationality; or simply a 
reasonable link between the State and the conduct. Specifically for business enterprises, the centre of 
activity, place of registration or domicile, or main place of business or substantial business activities 
are mentioned. Finally, a category of conduct is added that qualifies as violations of a peremptory 
norm of international law. For this category, the meaning of the obligation to protect if these violations 
also constitute a crime under international law is spelt out: “States must exercise universal jurisdiction 
over those bearing responsibility or lawfully transfer them to an appropriate jurisdiction.”34 An 
obligation to cooperate is incumbent on all States to “prevent human rights abuses by non-State actors, 
to hold them to account for any such abuses, and to ensure an effective remedy for those affected.”35 
Under the obligation to fulfil, States must take steps to create “an international enabling 
environment conducive to the universal fulfilment of economic, social and cultural rights, including in 
matters relating to bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, taxation, finance, environmental 
protection, and development cooperation.”36 This can be done through standard-setting, foreign 
policies and measures, and domestic policies and measures. Priority in the fulfilment of ESC rights 
extraterritorially must go to “the realisation of the rights of disadvantaged, marginalized and 
vulnerable groups” and to the “core obligations to realize minimum essential levels of economic, 
social and cultural rights”.37 Furthermore, States need to observe international human rights standards 
and principles, “move as expeditiously and effectively as possible towards the full realization of 
economic, social and cultural rights”, and avoid retrogressive measures. 
In addition, obligations to coordinate cooperation and to provide international assistance rest on 
States under the obligation to fulfil. The obligation to provide international assistance is defined quite 
unfortunately as a contribution to the fulfilment of ESC rights.38 A State that is unable to guarantee 
ESC rights within its territory is under an obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation. 
States that receive such a request and are in a position to provide assistance or to cooperate, “must 
consider the request in good faith, and respond in a manner consistent with their obligations to fulfil 
                                                     
31 Principle 20. 
32 Principle 21. 
33 Principle 26. 
34 Principle 25. 
35 Principle 27. 
36 Principle 29. 
37 Principle 32. 
38 For a scholarly suggestion on this, see R. Künnemann, Extraterritorial application of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in F. Coomans and M.T. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human 
Rights Treaties, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2004; for a critique, see W. Vandenhole and W. Benedek, Extraterritorial Human 
Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en W. van Genugten 
(eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International 
Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming. 
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economic, social and cultural rights extraterritorially.” The requesting State has in turn the obligation 
“to ensure that assistance provided is used towards the realisation of economic, social and cultural 
rights.”39 
The meaning of extraterritorial obligations has been explored in literature too, mainly building on 
the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ reading of them.40 The Maastricht 
Principles, by offering a more conceptual approach, hold the potential of assisting the Committee in 
further elaboration of their meaning. 
E. Distribution of Responsibility41 
The Maastricht Principles are pretty silent on the distribution of responsibility between the domestic 
State and third States, and among third States. That the domestic State bears primary responsibility for 
the realisation of ESC rights on its territory seems to go unquestioned. Principle 4 proclaims that each 
State has “the obligation to realize economic, social and cultural rights, for all persons within its 
territory […]” (emphasis added), and that all States “also have extraterritorial obligations […]” 
(emphasis added). Principles 19, 23 and 28 echo this approach. In particular for the obligation to fulfil 
ESC rights, the primary responsibility of the domestic State has been emphasized: “A State has the 
obligation to fulfil economic, social and cultural rights in its territory to the maximum of its ability”42 
and is under the obligation to seek international assistance and cooperation when it is unable to realise 
ESC rights within its territory.43 Logically, if the primary responsibility rests with the domestic State, 
other States can only have a complementary obligation. At first sight, that complementary obligation 
applies simultaneously: “All States have obligations to respect, protect and fulfil human rights, 
including civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights, both within their territories and 
extraterritorially.”44 On closer look, the extraterritorial obligation to fulfil has been further qualified, in 
that it is defined as an obligation to contribute to the fulfilment commensurate with capacities, 
available resources and influence.45 The obligations to provide international assistance and to 
cooperate in order to contribute to the fulfilment of ESC rights extraterritorially also seem to depend 
on a legitimate request from a State that is “unable, despite its best efforts,” to realise ESC rights 
within its territory, which illustrates once more the subsidiary or secondary nature of the 
extraterritorial obligation to fulfil. 
The Principles do not detail the apportioning of responsibility among third States. While they 
repeatedly state that all States “must take action, separately and jointly through international 
cooperation”,46 that all States must cooperate to protect ESC rights extraterritorially,47 and that they 
                                                     
39 Principles 33-35. 
40 See, e.g., M. Langford, F. Coomans and F. Gómez Isa, Extraterritorial Duties in International Law in M. Langford, W. 
Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming; W. Vandenhole, EU 
and Development: Extraterritorial Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in M.E. Salomon, A. Tostensen and W. Vandenhole (eds.), Casting the Net Wider: Human Rights, Development and 
New Duty-Bearers, Antwerp, Intersentia, 2007, 85-106, at 92-97. 
41 Responsibility is used here in its plain language meaning, and not in the specific sense of the ILC Articles on State 
Responsibility. In the latter, responsibility is confined to a violations approach, i.e. responsibility is engaged as a result of 
attributable conduct that constitutes a breach of an international obligation. We use responsbility here to refer in a general 
way to the set of human rights obligations incumbent on a particular state. 
42 Principle 31. 
43 Principle 34. 
44 Principle 4, and echoed for the obligations to respect, protect and fulfil in Principles 19, 23 and 28. 
45 Principle 31. This is reiterated in particular also for the obligation to provide international assistance in Principle 33. 
46 Principles 19, 23 and 28-29. 
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“should coordinate with each other in order to cooperate effectively in the universal fulfilment of ESC 
rights”, little is said on what particular States should do. Some guidance can nevertheless be found. 
With regard to the extraterritorial obligation to protect, reference is made to those States that are in a 
position to regulate or to influence.48 With regard to the extraterritorial obligations to fulfil, and more 
in particular the obligation to coordinate, it is clarified that lack of coordination “does not exonerate a 
State from giving effect to its separate extraterritorial obligations.” Principle 31 clarifies that the 
contribution to the fulfilment of ESC rights extraterritorially must be commensurate with capacities, 
resources and influence. The obligation to provide international assistance is confined to States “in a 
position to do so”.49 
Scholarly attempts to clarify the distribution of responsibility between States have based their 
analysis on the tripartite typology of obligations, i.e. obligations to respect, to protect and to fulfil. 
They do not challenge the primary responsibility of the territorial State, but argue that the 
extraterritorial obligations to respect and to protect are broadly similar in scope and meaning to 
territorial obligations (Vandenhole and Benedek quality them as complementary and simultaneous for 
that reason).50 The extraterritorial obligation to fulfil on the other hand has been considered in 
principle to be of a supplemental (Khalfan) or subsidiary (Vandenhole and Benedek) nature to the 
territorial one. The subsidiary nature refers not to a reduced extraterritorial obligation to assist in 
fulfilment, but to the fact that that obligation is not immediate, in the sense that it is qualified by time 
and resources. With regard to the division of responsibility among extraterritorial States under the 
obligation to fulfil, Vandenhole en Benedek have suggested ways for identifying which States are in a 
position to assist, what the scope of their obligation is, and towards whom they hold the obligation.51 
F. Intermediate Conclusions on the Maastricht Principles 
The Maastricht Principles represent a major step forward in conceptualising the human rights 
obligations of foreign States. They have imbued the often problematic notion of jurisdiction, which is 
central to the attribution of responsibility in the field of civil and political rights, with new meaning, 
and have clarified well how the tripartite typology of obligations to respect, protect and fulfil may 
work out in the area of extraterritorial obligations. On the other hand, they are rather weak in 
clarifying their legal sources and do not make a major contribution to the question of distribution of 
responsibility among States, be they domestic or foreign. Moreover, their scope of application remains 
limited to extraterritorial States, to the exclusion of non-State actors. 
(Contd.)                                                                  
47 Principle 27. 
48 Principles 24 and 26. 
49 Principles 33 and 35. 
50 In their view, “‘complementary’ recognises that a State’s extraterritorial obligations are always present while 
simultaneously affirming that the domestic State’s obligation remain primary”, W. Vandenhole and W. Benedek, 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en 
W. van Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
in International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming. 
51 A. Khalfan, Division of Responsibility between States in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en W. van 
Genugten (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in 
International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming. 
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III. Business Enterprises 
A. Background 
There are two sets of principles governing the human rights obligations of business enterprises: the 
UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (2011) (hereafter: the Guiding Principles)52 
and the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises 
with Regard to Human Rights (2003) (hereafter: the Norms).53 The latter built on the work of 
Weisbrodt, and were initially drafted as a code of conduct for transnational corporations.54 They were 
adopted in 2003 by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. 
Following their rejection by the UN Commission on Human Rights in 2004, in line with the hostile 
reception that they had received from the business community, Ruggie was appointed as Special 
Representative of the Secretary-General in 2005.55 
Ruggie was dismissive (at least in part) of the Norms, inter alia on the fact that they spoke directly 
to corporations.56 He developed during his mandate his own Protect, Respect and Remedy 
Framework,57 which culminated in the Guiding Principles. The latter were endorsed by the UN 
Human Rights Council in July 2011. While the Guiding Principles will dominate the debates in the 
coming years,58 for our purposes the Norms offer more engaging starting points. As Kinley and 
Chambers have argued, the “Norms do have [the] potential and ought to be supported as a viable first 
step in the establishment of an international legal framework through which companies can be held 
accountable for any human rights abuses they inflict, or in which they are complicit.”59 This is not to 
ignore the political reality that the Norms are dead, but to underline the continuing conceptual 
relevance of the Norms, as they speak directly to a non-State actor, i.e. corporations. Moreover, the 
Norms have an explicit focus on transnational corporations, which are central to our concerns here. 
                                                     
52 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: 
Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, UN Doc. A/HRC/17/31 of 21 March 
2011. 
53 Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational 
Corporations and other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 of 26 
August 2003. 
54 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 454. 
55 Ibid., at 449-450, 457-458 on opposition from some business groups and States. 
56 Interim Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97, paras. 64-69; for an analysis, see 
D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 460-461. 
57 For all documents, see http://www.business-humanrights.org/SpecialRepPortal/Home. 
58 Compare Jägers, who qualifies Ruggie’s work as an “authoritative focal point embraced by many of the stakeholders 
involded” (N. Jägers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real Corporate 
Accountability?, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, 159-163, at 159. 
59 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 450. 
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B. General 
The Norms were meant as a statement of the human rights obligations of transnational corporations60 
within their spheres of activity and influence. Rights covered include the right to equal opportunity 
and non-discriminatory treatment, the right to security of persons, and the rights of workers. 
Additionally, obligations with regard to consumer protection and environmental protection were 
identified.  
The Guiding Principles build on the Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework and mainly 
emphasize the State obligation to protect. As pointed out by Jägers, “Ruggie has steered determinedly 
away from the concept of human rights obligations for corporations and instead placed exclusive 
emphasis on the State as the sole duty-bearer.”61 In addition to the State obligation to protect, a 
corporate responsibility to respect human rights and access to remedy are the two other major building 
blocks of the Guiding Principles. For each of the three building blocks, foundational and operational 
principles have been identified. 
Our focus is on transnational corporations only, and on two aspects in particular: i.e. the 
obligations incumbent on home States of transnational corporations on the one hand, and the direct 
obligations of transnational corporations on the other hand. 
C. Legal Nature of the Norms and Guiding Principles, and Legal Basis of the Obligations Identified 
The Norms as adopted by the Sub-Commission in 2003 clearly intended to contribute to the making 
and further development of international law, as is reflected in preambular paragraphs 12 and 14. They 
note that “further standard-setting and implementation are required” and that the human rights norms 
in the Norms “will contribute to the making and development of international law” regarding the 
human rights obligations and responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business 
enterprises. So while the Norms clearly drew on international human rights hard law,62 extending their 
applicability to business enterprises was clearly recognized as law in the making. It has been pointed 
out usefully in the literature on the topic that direct duties of (transnational) corporations have already 
been accepted in areas other than international human rights law, so that there is no “doctrinal bar to 
such duties”.63 
The Guiding Principles explicitly claim not to create new human rights obligations: 
The Guiding Principles’ normative contribution lies not in the creation of new international law 
obligations but in elaborating the implications of existing standards and practices for States and 
businesses; integrating them within a single, logically coherent and comprehensive template; and 
identifying where the current regime falls short and how it should be improved.64 
Here too, the innovation potentially lies in extending the applicability of existing norms to a new actor 
beyond the State, i.e. business enterprises. The Guiding Principles do so in a much more limited way 
than the Norms however. 
                                                     
60 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 451. 
61 N. Jägers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real Corporate 
Accountability?, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, 159-163, at 160. 
62 See in particular the references in the Commentary, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, 
Commentary on the Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and other Business Enterprises with 
Regard to Human Rights, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/38/Rev.2 of 26 August 2003. 
63 S.R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 The Yale Law Journal 2001, 443-
545, at 450. 
64 Guiding Principles, para. 14. 
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D. Scope and Meaning of the Obligations Incumbent on Transnational Corporations and Home 
States  
a. Transnational Corporations 
The Norms define the substantive obligation of all business enterprises, including transnational 
corporations, in exactly the same way as that incumbent on States, i.e. they have the “obligation to 
promote, secure the fulfilment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect human rights recognized in 
international as well as national law.”65 However, in para. 12, with regard to economic, social and 
cultural rights, reference is made to contribution to their realisation.66 We disagree with this approach, 
as we pointed out earlier more specifically with regard to the extraterritorial obligation to fulfil.67 
More detailed provisions have been elaborated on non-discrimination, right to security68 and rights of 
workers.  
The scope of that obligation is however seriously circumscribed, in that they only have that 
obligation “[w]ithin their respective spheres of activity and influence”,69 or in the words of Kinley and 
Chambers, they have “only those human rights obligations proximate to a corporation’s business”.70 
This delineation criterion builds in part on language used in the Global Compact and arguably also the 
OECD Guidelines.71 Nevertheless, the obligation “applies equally to activities occurring in the home 
country or territory of the transnational corporation or other business enterprise, and in any country in 
which the business is engaged in activities.”72 (emphasis added). The latter is of particular interest to 
us for present purposes. 
The Guiding Principles evoke a weak corporate responsibility to respect human rights, i.e. to 
“avoid infringing on the human rights of others and […] [to] address adverse human rights impacts 
with which they are involved.”73 So, first of all, mention is only made of a responsibility in the sense 
of a “global standard of expected conduct”74 or a “basic expectation [of] society”,75 not of a legally 
binding obligation. Secondly, it mainly entails a negative obligation of abstention, besides a positive 
one to “address adverse human rights impacts with which they are involved.”76 The latter is further 
clarified, and arguably partly watered down, in Principle 13, which holds that business enterprises 
need to address adverse human rights impacts of their own activities, as well as “[s]eek to prevent or 
                                                     
65 Norms, para. 1. This seems to be an attempt to combine the tripartite typology now commonly used with regard to 
economic, social and cultural rights (respect, protect and fulfil) and the one found in art. 2 ICCPR (respect and ensure).  
66 Kinley and Chambers have argued that that is the “correct obligation”, D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human 
Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 
2006, 447-497, at 29, footnote 121.  
67 Supra note 38. 
68 Kinley and Chambers have pointed out that the obligation is broader with regard to the right to security in para. 3, see D. 
Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 454. 
69 Norms, para. 1. 
70 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 462. 
71 Ibid., at 469. 
72 Commentary, p. 4. 
73 Guiding Principles, para. 11. 
74 Guiding Principles, para. 11, Commentary. 
75 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 of 7 April 2008, para. 9. 
76 Guiding Principles para. 11. 
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mitigate adverse human rights impacts that are directly linked to their operations, products or services 
by their business relationships […].”77 (emphasis added). Furthermore, while reference is made to 
“internationally recognized human rights”, a minimal content is then given to that expression by 
referring to the International Bill of Rights (the Universal Declaration and the two 1966 Covenants) 
and the “principles concerning fundamental rights set out in the International Labour Organization’s 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work”,78 thereby seemingly ignoring seven other 
UN core human rights treaties. 
On a positive note, the corporate responsibility to protect is said to apply up to parent companies 
and down to the supply chain:79 
The responsibility of business enterprises to respect human rights applies to all enterprises 
regardless of their size, sector, operational context, ownership and structure. Nevertheless, the 
scale and complexity of the means through which enterprises meet that responsibility may vary 
according to these factors and with the severity of the enterprise’s adverse human rights impacts.80 
However, by downplaying the legal nature of this responsibility, its practical relevance may be 
limited. 
Business enterprises, including transnational corporations, have a stronger responsibility in 
conflict-affected areas in particular, where there may be increased risks of being complicit in gross 
human rights abuses. They “should treat the risk of causing or contributing to gross human rights 
abuses as a legal compliance issue wherever they operate”, given the potential corporate civil and/or 
criminal legal liability through extraterritorial civil claims or the Rome Statute.81 
Ratner has developed “a theory in four parts” to define the scope of direct obligations for 
companies, “based on an inductive approach that reflects the actual operations of business 
enterprises”.82 That scope is defined by four clusters of issues: “the corporation’s relationship with the 
government, its nexus to affected populations, the particular human right at issue, and the place of 
individuals violating human rights within the corporate structure.”83 As to the relationship with the 
government, three types of relationship are examined: the corporation as governmental agency, as 
complicit with governments, and as having command responsibility. The nexus to affected populations 
as a second cluster is needed because, contrary to States, corporations cannot be said to have 
obligations towards individuals on their territory, for they do not have a territory. Ratner draws 
therefore on moral philosophy on interpersonal duties,84 and forwards the degree of proximity between 
individuals and a company (in concentric circles or spheres of influence: employees, their families, the 
locality where it has a plant, its consumers, the territory it manages in case of exploitation of natural 
resources and so on). The third cluster, i.e. the particular human right at issue, zooms in on substantive 
rights. Central to the analysis is the need to balance the right at issue with the company’s interests, 
with the exception of those rights that are recognized in the traditional State paradigm as absolute or 
non-derogable. The author argues strongly against extending corporate duties beyond the negative 
                                                     
77 Guiding Principles, para. 13. 
78 Guiding Principles, para. 12. 
79 Compare N. Jägers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real Corporate 
Accountability?, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, 159-163, at 162. 
80 Guiding Principles, para. 14. 
81 Guiding Principles, para. 23. 
82 S.R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 The Yale Law Journal 2001, 443-
545, at 496. 
83 Ibid., at 496-497. 
84 Ibid., at 506-507. 
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obligation not to do harm85 as that “seems inconsistent with the reality of corporate enterprise.”86 This 
limited focus on negative obligations only, seems to be mainly informed by pragmatism, i.e. that it is 
too early in the international legal process of recognizing the human rights obligations of companies to 
include also positive obligations.87 Given the wide recognition of positive human rights obligations, 
and the often blurry lines between negative and positive obligations, a minimalistic approach may not 
be warranted. Finally, secondary rules of attribution are addressed, in particular to “connect individual 
violators to the company”.88 While Ratner’s theory was developed for business enterprises in general, 
by and large it can also be applied to transnational corporations more in particular. 
b. Home States of Transnational Corporations 
In the Guiding Principles, the responsibility of the home State to regulate the extraterritorial activities 
of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction is framed much more weakly as a soft 
obligation (“should”) “to set out clearly the expectation” that these business enterprises “respect 
human rights throughout their operations”.89 The rationale for the soft obligation can be found in the 
Commentary: “At present States are not generally required under international human rights law to 
regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction.”90 
The Guiding Principles mainly see “strong policy reasons” to do so, “especially where the State itself 
is involved in or supports those businesses.”91 
These foundational principles have been further elaborated in a number of operational principles. 
With regard to our focus on the responsibility of home States, the operational principles under the 
headings of “The State-business nexus” and “Supporting business respect for human rights in conflict-
affected areas” are particularly instructive. Operational principle 4 requires additional protective steps 
by the State towards business enterprises that are owned or controlled by the State, or that receive 
substantial support or services from the State, e.g. through export credit agencies, official investment 
insurance agencies, development agencies or development finance institutions. These additional steps 
may include, “where appropriate”, “requiring human rights due diligence”.92 Home States also have 
the duty to help ensure that transnational corporations operating in conflict-affected areas are not 
involved in gross human rights abuses. This duty may include prevention but also liability for 
transnational companies that they are home to, and that are involved in gross human rights abuses.93 
The Guiding Principles accept without any qualification that “States retain their international 
human rights law obligations when they participate in [multilateral] institutions.”94 States as members 
of multilateral institutions are therefore said to have the following (soft) obligations: they should seek 
to ensure that multilateral institutions do not restrain the ability of States to meet their obligation to 
                                                     
85 With the limited exception of those positive obligations “cleary necessary to effect” the negative obligations, see ibid., at 
517. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Ibid., at 517. 
88 Ibid., at 518. 
89 Guiding Principles, para. 2. 
90 For a fierce criticism, labeling this statement as “not correct” and in contradiction with established obligations for States, 
see N. Jägers, UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights: Making Headway towards Real Corporate 
Accountability?, 29/2 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2011, 159-163. 
91 Guiding Principles, para. 2, Commentary. 
92 For an exploration of the concept in both corporate law, human rights law and Ruggie’s framework, see T. Lambooy, 
Corporate Due Diligence as a Tool to Respect Human Rights, 28/3 Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 2010, 404-
448. 
93 Guiding Principles, para. 7, Commentary. 
94 Guiding Principles, para. 10, Commentary. 
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protect, nor hinder corporations from respecting human rights, and they should encourage the 
multilateral institutions to “promote business respect for human rights” and to help States meet their 
duty to protect “where requested”.95  
E. Distribution of Responsibility between Transnational Corporations and States 
While the Norms generally and primarily focus on the direct human rights obligations of business 
enterprises, they start off in the first paragraph by repeating the well-established human rights tenet 
that States have the primary responsibility for human rights, including the obligation to protect against 
business enterprises. Moreover, there is a savings clause that inter alia provides that nothing in the 
Norms should be construed as diminishing the human rights obligations of States.96 This suggests that 
business enterprises themselves have a complementary obligation, albeit simultaneously with States.97 
Kinley and Chambers see “the subordination of corporate responsibility to state responsibility” as a 
“key substantive feature”,98 but do not rule out joint responsibility for a state and an TNC within their 
respective spheres of activity and influence, in case a State fails his human rights duties e.g.99 They 
also envisage corporate responsibility in instances of complicity of a corporation in a State’s human 
rights violations.100 While the notion has been borrowed from criminal law, it has already broader use 
in international (see e.g. the Articles on State Responsibility) and national law.101 Nevertheless, the 
concept of complicity has evolved over time as a secondary rule for establishing individual and 
criminal responsibility,102 and is therefore not so easily to transplant to corporate, human rights 
responsibility. The threshold for corporate human rights complicity is not clear either. Kinley and 
Chambers have suggested that knowledge of foreseeable harmful effects (intentional participation 
though not intention to harm) may suffice to reach that threshold.103  
The Guiding Principles, which build on the protect, respect and remedy framework, rest on 
“differentiated but complementary responsibilities”.104 They lay primary human rights responsibility, 
also with regard to corporate conduct, with States: primarily and as a strong obligation with the host 
State, and much more weakly with the home State of the business enterprise. Foundational Principle 1 
                                                     
95 Guiding Principles, para. 10. 
96 Norms, para. 19. 
97 See our conceptualisation of distributing and apportioning of responsibility in W. Vandenhole and W. Benedek, 
Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations and the North-South Divide, in M. Langford, W. Vandenhole, M. Scheinin, en 
W. van Genugten (eds.), (eds.), Global Justice, State Duties. The Extraterritorial Scope of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights in International Law, Cambridge, CUP, 2012, forthcoming; compare Kinley and Chambers who argue that “the 
Norms provide for the imposition of contempareous and complementary human rights responsibilities on corporations 
within their ‘spheres of activity and influence’.” (D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for 
Corporations: The Private Implications of Public International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 
21). 
98 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 462. 
99 Ibid., 467. 
100 Ibid., 455 and 468. 
101 Ibid., 468. 
102 S.R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 The Yale Law Journal 2001, 443-
545, at 491-494. 
103 D. Kinley and R. Chambers, The UN Human Rights Norms for Corporations: The Private Implications of Public 
International Law, 6/3 Human Rights Law Review 2006, 447-497, at 455, 469. Compare .R. Ratner, Corporations and 
Human Rights: A Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 The Yale Law Journal 2001, 443-545, at 500-504. 
104 Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational 
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, John Ruggie, Protect, Respect and Remedy: a Framework for Business and 
Human Rights, UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 of 7 April 2008, para. 9. 
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holds that the host States “must protect against human rights abuse within their territory and/or 
jurisdiction by […] business enterprises.” This host State duty to protect is said to be a standard of 
conduct.105 The responsibility of the home State to regulate the extraterritorial activities of businesses 
domiciled in their territory and/or jurisdiction is framed much more weakly as a soft obligation “to set 
out clearly the expectation” that these business enterprises “respect human rights throughout their 
operations”, as noted above.106 Only in the case of involvement of transnational corporations in gross 
human rights violations in conflict-affected areas some light is shed on the division of responsibility 
between the host and home State, albeit that the commentary defines that responsibility as having 
“roles to play in assisting both those corporations and host States”. Justification for the home State 
obligation is sought in the fact that “the “host” State may be unable to protect human rights adequately 
due to a lack of effective control.”107 So, in these particular instances of transnational corporations that 
are involved in gross human rights violations in conflict-affected areas, responsibility tilts towards the 
home State, which has then also more specific obligations (see higher). As to the relationship of State 
obligations with the direct responsibility of transnational corporations, no clarification can be found in 
the Guiding Principles.  
F. Intermediate Conclusions 
The human rights obligations of transnational corporations themselves have been addressed most 
explicitly in the Norms, which however do not enjoy much support. The Guiding Principles are not 
very outspoken on the human rights obligations of home States and of transnational corporations 
themselves, and where they address them, they tend to do so in soft and non-legal terms – with the 
exception of gross human rights violations in conflict-affected areas. 
IV. International Financial Organisations 
A. Background 
The Tilburg Guiding Principles, the only attempt so far to identify principles on the human rights 
obligations of the International Financial Institutions, were drafted by a group of experts at two 
meetings at Tilburg University in October 2001 and April 2002. Of the four sets of principles here 
under discussion, they are probably most “private” in nature. A decade later, they were revisited at a 
GLOTHRO workshop in April 2012. 
B. General 
The Tilburg Principles consist of two main parts: a part on underlying notions and observations, and 
one on the actual principles themselves. Both parts consist of three sections: one that addresses the 
point of human rights obligations for IFIs (paras. 1-8, respectively paras. 23-31), one on “Linking 
Legal Obligations in the Field of Human Rights to Economic and Political Realities” (paras. 9-16, 
respectively paras. 32-34), and one on evaluation and redress of adverse human rights impacts (paras. 
17-22, respectively paras. 35-42). 
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There is a long-standing debate on whether the International Financial Institutions, in particular the 
International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, have direct human rights obligations.108 The IFIs 
themselves have also themselves engaged in that discussion, albeit the World Bank has done much 
more so than the IMF. Comparable to the question whether home States have human rights obligations 
in relation to these companies, there is also the question to what extent member States of IFIs – for the 
latter are intergovernmental organisations – have human rights obligations in relation to IFIs. 
C. Legal Nature of the Guiding Principles, and Legal Basis of the Obligations Identified 
The Tilburg Principles, as principles adopted by scholars, do not have any legal status as of 
themselves. 
The Tilburg Principles primarily make the point that the International Financial Organisations have 
an organisational independence from their member States,109 so that their own, direct human rights 
obligations need to be acknowledged. First of all, reference is made to the fact that the World Bank 
and the IMF are international legal persons. Secondly, their status as UN Specialized Agencies that 
have entered into Relationship Agreements with the UN is pointed out, as “another indication of their 
international legal personality separate from their members.”110 Secondly, it is argued that that 
organisational independence does not mean that they are not subjected to international law, rather to 
the contrary: as actors with international legal personality, they have international legal obligations.111 
The acknowledgment in the IMF Articles of Agreement that the domestic social and political policies 
of members must be respected is understood to also include international commitments to human 
rights.112 
Senior legal advisors of the World Bank have accepted that a teleological (“purposive”) 
interpretation of the Articles of Agreement is needed.113 In light of a changed understanding of 
sovereignty, a reading of the World Bank Articles’ prohibition on political interference has been 
forwarded whereby “taking into account, where appropriate, human rights issues and members’ 
international human rights obligations does not contravene the Articles’ prohibition on political 
interference.”114 Beyond the possibility of taking into account human rights, it has also been argued 
that there are instances in which the World Bank should take human rights into account, i.e. “[w]here 
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violations or non-fulfilment of obligations are at issue, and where these have an economic impact 
[…].” And “if a human rights violation leads to a breach of international obligations relevant to the 
Bank […].”115 All in all, this cannot but be interpreted as a recognition (albeit not in plain language) of 
the Bank’s direct human rights obligations,116 as reflected also in the concluding paragraph of the 
Legal Opinion: “In conclusion, the Articles of Agreement permit, and in some cases require, the Bank 
to recognize the human rights dimensions of its development policies and activities since it is now 
evident that human rights are an intrinsic part of the Bank’s mission.”117 Moreover, the then World 
Bank Group General Counsel, Palacio, in 2006 still seemed to only accept that the World Bank can, 
but is under no obligation, to take human rights into account.118 McInerney, currently senior policy 
officer, Institutions, Law & Partnerships for Human Rights at the World Bank, writing in a personal 
capacity in 2010, has spoken out against direct human rights obligations for IFIs. She has argued in 
favour of “locating those obligations with states, at least initially”119 for the State is still the primary 
duty bearer in international human rights law.120 She has even warned that “the eagerness to assign 
direct obligations to IFIs, particularly from non-treaty sources, has set the debate back because of the 
limitations attending those sources, deflecting attention from the relevant established obligations of 
states under human rights treaties.”121 IMF representatives have been less outspoken on the human 
rights obligations of that institution. In a publication of 2005 written by a former general counsel of 
the IMF, writing in his personal capacity, Darrow has identified “tacit concessions”, i.e. “an 
acknowledgement that the IMF is bound by relevant principles of customary law and general 
principles of law as they relate to human rights […].”122 
In the literature, a strong argument has been made for considering IFIs as subjects of international 
law, based on their Articles of Agreement, their status as Specialized Agencies of the United Nations, 
and the facts that they are composed of States that have human rights obligations.123 Sources for their 
human rights obligations have been said to include the (fundamental human rights principles of the) 
UN Charter, customary law, and general principles of international law. Indirectly, human rights 
treaties may play a role, as they do inform the development of the latter sources.124 
In addition, the Tilburg Guiding Principles reiterate the obligations of the member States of the 
IFIs: “When representatives of member States determine the policies of the two IFIs, they are bound 
by their States’ international obligations, including those arising from international human rights 
law.”125 The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has consistently emphasized 
that member States of the IFIs are under an obligation to pay greater attention to the protection of 
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economic, social and cultural rights within the policies of these organisations.126 This position in turn 
seems to draw heavily on the Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights, Guideline 19 of which holds: 
Acts by International Organisations 
19. The obligations of States to protect economic, social and cultural rights extend also to their 
participation in international organisations, where they act collectively. It is particularly important 
for States to use their influence to ensure that violations do not result from the programmes and 
policies of the organisations of which they are members. It is crucial for the elimination of 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights for international organisations, including 
international financial institutions, to correct their policies and practices so that they do not result 
in deprivation of economic, social and cultural rights. Member States of such organisations, 
individually or through the governing bodies […] should encourage and generalise the trend of 
several such organisations to revise their policies and programmes to take into account issues of 
economic, social and cultural rights, especially when these policies and programmes are 
implemented in countries that lack the resources to resist the pressure brought by international 
institutions on their decision-making affecting economic, social and cultural rights. 
D. Meaning and Scope of Obligations 
a. Direct obligations of IFIs 
The scope of the IFIs’ direct human rights obligations is circumscribed in the Guiding Principles in a 
twofold way. First of all, they are limited to respect obligations, i.e. negative obligations. Secondly, 
these obligations only concern “situations where the institutions’ own projects, policies or 
programmes negatively impact or undermine the enjoyment of human rights.”127 In the Guiding 
Principles part proper, it is said that the macro-economic policy of the IFIs “should take into account 
its impact on human development objectives, including human rights”, and that they “should integrate 
human rights considerations into all aspects of their operations and internal functioning.”128 Prevention 
of human rights violations should be given high priority, and if violations occur nevertheless, 
“measures for mitigating the impact thereof and mechanisms of accountability and redress should be 
put into place.”129 In the clause proposed for inclusion in the policies of the IFIs, the negative nature of 
their obligation is reconfirmed: i.e. not to finance projects (in the case of the World Bank) or not to 
enter in financial agreements (in the case of the IMF) “that contravene applicable international human 
rights law”.130 
In addition, procedural obligations of transparent decision-making and active participation of those 
affected have been identified.131 The IFIs should also ensure accessibility of accountability 
mechanisms and undertake human rights impact assessments ex ante and ex post.132 
Darrow has summarized the current understanding of the human rights obligations of IFIs as 
follows: “Mainstream international legal opinion would say that this translates into a minimum 
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obligation that the bank and the IMF respect (or at least not violate) human rights commitments in 
force in member countries and arguably also to protect human rights within the scope of their 
influence and activities at the country level. Many commentators go further still to argue that these 
institutions should promote or perhaps even fulfil human rights.”133 Skogly belongs to the latter 
category, and has argued that “the institutions are under negative obligations to respect and to protect 
human rights in their own operations through their policies, programmes and projects, and to fulfil 
human rights whenever this obligation stems from customary international law and general principles 
of law.”134 She has limited the obligation to protect to the extent that the IFIs are “in a position to 
control the conduct of third parties.”135 
b. Member States of IFIs 
The obligation under international human rights law of States in a position to assist, to provide 
international assistance and co-operation is said to mean for member States of the IFIs that they are 
under “the duty to work actively towards an equitable financial investment and multilateral trading 
system that is condusive to the reduction and eradication of poverty and the full realisation of all 
human rights.”136 “When determining the policies, programmes and projects of the World Bank and 
the IMF, member States must comply with their obligations under international human rights law, 
including the duty to engage in international assistance and co-operation.”137 
E. Distribution of Responsibility 
The Tilburg Guiding Principles are quite silent on the question of distribution or apportioning of 
responsibility between the IFIS themselves and their member States, let alone among their member 
States. They do recall though the basic tenet of current international human rights law that the 
“primary responsibilities and obligations in the field of domestic human rights enjoyment […]remain 
with the State.” This is (also) intended as a savings clause, as the next sentence reads: “States cannot 
‘delegate’ human rights obligations to, for instance, international institutions and relieve themselves of 
these obligations.”138 
In literature, some have emphasized the shared and separate responsibility of the IFIs themselves 
and their member States, with some attempts to assess and define the individual responsibility of those 
member States that have Executive Directors in the IFIs.139 Skogly has identified substantive and 
procedural separate direct human rights obligations for the IFIs in addition to obligations that they 
share with creditor States.140 A detailed discussion on a portioning responsibility to each of the actors 
involved does not seem to have undertaken yet. 
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F. Intermediate Conclusions on the Tilburg Guiding Principles 
In 2002, the central point to be made was that IFIs do have own (at least negative) human rights 
obligations as subjects of international law. Time may now have come to move forward, and to follow 
up on what was said in para. 28: “For reasons of operationalisation, general human rights obligations 
for the World Bank and the IMF should be specified in a practical and accessible instrument by which 
the two IFIs are to be guided in all their decisions and on the basis of which they can be held 
accountable.” 
V. Lessons learnt – Some Tentative Conclusions 
What can be learnt from efforts over the last decade to define the human rights obligations of States 
when having transnational impact either through their own acts or through those of transnational 
corporations and the International Financial Institutions, and of transnational corporations and the 
International Financial Institutions themselves directly? Have the responsibility regimes for each of 
these actors been convincingly established, in a way that they are able to address the responsibility 
gaps perceived on the ground? Has the fragmented method of elaboration of principles for each 
different actor led to a coherent legal framework or rather to legal patchwork that is bound to fail in 
effectively dealing with the global landscape and its various actors? Is a holistic approach to be 
preferred? Can the current only fully developed regime of (territorial) state responsibility be used by 
analogy, or do we need to start from scratch? 
As pointed out in the preceding intermediate conclusions, none of the sets of principles 
comprehensively addresses all issues of attribution and distribution of responsibility. However, it is 
safe to say that the Maastricht Principles are the most detailed and elaborate ones. The Tilburg 
Principles are much less advanced, and mainly seem to serve the purpose of supporting the point that 
IFIs do have human rights obligations. The Guiding Principles stop from making the basic point that 
transnational corporations are direct human rights duty bearers, in contrast with the Norms. A 
recurrent theme in all sets is the human rights obligations of States as members of international 
organisations. A theme specific to the Guiding Principles is the human rights responsibility of home 
States of transnational corporations. All in all, the responsibility regimes emerging from the different 
sets of principles under scrutiny here do not seem to capture yet the full scope of the respective actors’ 
impact on human rights on the ground.  
As to the consistency of the current sets of principles, perhaps the most striking contradiction is 
that situated at the level of the basic point whether other actors than the territorial or domestic State do 
have human rights obligations: the Maastricht Principles, the Norms and the Tilburg Principles answer 
that question in the affirmative, the Guiding Principles downplay the direct human rights obligations 
of transnational corporations and propose instead a societal expectation. We thus still seem to be far 
away from universal acceptance that “there is no logical reason why the situation of a person whose 
economic or social rights have been adversely affected by the acts of a state or a transnational 
corporation should be given more attention and protection than a similarly situated person whose 
rights have been adversely affected by the operations of an IFI.”141 
Looking at the sets of principles in yet some more detail, the following comparative conclusions 
can be drawn: 
a) the Maastricht Principles and the Guiding Principles are predominantly if not exclusively state-
centred, while the Norms and the Tilburg Principles address the direct obligations of non-state 
actors, i.e. transnational corporations and International Financial Institutions respectively. 
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b) All remain fairly vague or silent on their own legal status, and on the legal sources they draw on. 
c) The meaning and scope of the human rights obligations identified are quite at variance, which 
does not seem to be explained by the varying degrees of power and impact that the actors 
concerned have. The broadest regime has been developed for foreign States: the Maastricht 
Principles contain an expansive notion of jurisdiction for the attribution of responsibility, and hold 
all three types of obligations (respect, protect and fulfil) to be applicable to these States. For 
transnational corporations, the Norms use the dual concept of sphere of activity and influence to 
attribute obligations to transnational corporations, and apply the same types of obligations as for 
States. The Guiding Principles however limit the obligations of transnational corporations to 
respect obligations. Finally, with regard to the International Financial Institutions, the Tilburg 
Principles also confine themselves to respect obligations.  
d) In the relationship between the traditional domestic or host State on the one hand, and foreign or 
host States, or non-State actors on the other hand, the primary responsibility of that domestic or 
host State goes completely unchallenged. Foreign or home States, or non-State actors have 
therefore always a complementary responsibility only, although that may be a simultaneous or a 
subsidiary one. There is less clarity, and possibly also less consistency in the way the distribution 
of responsibility is envisaged among other actors than the domestic or host State, e.g. among 
several foreign States, or among the home State and the transnational corporation itself, or among 
a creditor State and an IFI. The Maastricht Principles insist on the need for cooperation among 
foreign/extraterritorial States with regard to the obligations to protect and to fulfill.  
Whether or not the current legal regime on territorial State obligations and State responsibility proper 
can be transplanted by analogy to the actors under discussion, a neat separation seems to be warranted 
between foreign States and home States on the one hand, and non-State actors on the other hand. As to 
foreign and home States, an analogy reasoning seems justified. However, for non-State actors, a point 
made by Bradlow and Hunter on IFIs is worth recalling here: 
[T]he ILC process has stumbled by relying too heavily on state responsibility as an analogue for 
the responsibility of international organizations. [footnote omitted] Although the analogy has 
value, over-reliance on it tends to underplay the differences between states, which are 
geographically defined and have general powers and responsibilities, and international 
organizations, which can operate across regions and national borders, but have particular structures 
and limited powers and mandates defined by their founding treaties.”142 
This view allows for generalisation, in our view, to transnational corporations, which also are not 
geographically defined, but have particular structures and mandates. Of course, saying what should not 
be done is only a first step. The challenge ahead is to come with alternatives. A methodological 
proposal made by Ratner with regard to direct obligations for companies, i.e. to “construct a theory 
both down from state responsibility and up from individual responsibility” thereby acknowledging 
“that, in general terms, a corporation is, as it were, more than an individual and less than a state”,143 
deserves further scrutiny. However, more innovative methodologies may also warranted, whereby 
inspiration is sought outside human rights law and/or the legal toolbox, such as in other fields of law 
but also in philosophy or ethics.144  
But even if we confine ourselves to the emerging sets of principles that we have discussed here, 
and do not seek a globalisation of human rights law at this stage yet, an enormous research agenda is 
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ahead of us. Several concepts are still in search of a definition (sphere of activity and influence145; 
complicity146), the onus of proof needs to be defined with regard to the meaning and scope of 
obligations,147 and the distribution of responsibility is still in its infancy. 
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